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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
* * * * * * * * *

HARRY THORSEN,

)
Plaintiff,

)

-vs-

)

MARKAY JOHNSON , et a] ,

)

Defendants.

)

GOOSEBERRY ESTATES, et al. ,

:

Plaintiffs and
Respondents,

:
)

-vsHARRY THORSEN and DONALD GATES, )
Defendants and
Appellants.
k

*

*

A

*

k

)
:
A

A

*

A

rf

k

k

I

*

;

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction to hear this
matter

pursuant

to

the

provisions

of

§78-2-2,

Utah

Code

Annotated, 19 53 and Rule 4, Rules of the Utah Supreme Court.

NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Respondent

Gooseberry

Estates,

a

partnership

("Gooseberry") asks this Court to affi rm the Order ai id Judgment
subject of review on the basis that the uncontradicted evidence
on the hearing to reassess damages entitles the Respondents to
the revised (and reduced) damages awarded by the Court below.

There remains no issue of liability

—

only the

question of damages.
The present proceeding is an appeal from the Judgment
of the trial court in reassessing damages as directed by this
Court [Thorsen vs. Johnson, et al.y 745 P.2d 1243 (1988)].

The trial court

considered the matter on Motion and affidavits as provided in
Rule 43(b) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and entered a Judgment
for Gooseberry Estates in the amount of $38,785.00 as the
difference in value of the damaged land as an entire parcel
(undivided) immediately after injury as compared to its value
immediately before, which value appraisers for both sides had
agreed was $1,250.00 per acre.

NATURE OF THE CASE
This Court in an opinion of November 5, 1987, (the
Decision is found at 745 P. 2d at page 1243) affirmed the trial
court's holding that Appellant Harry Thorsen

("Thorsen") was

liable to Gooseberry for damages but remanded the case to the
District Court for the reason that the amount of damages was
arrived at by an erroneous method; instructing the lower Court
to reassess damages by an appropriate formula.
This Court's remanding decision (hereinafter "Thorsen
I") was that the trial court had made several unjustified
assumptions

in calculating

damages, citing the decision of

1956, State vs. Tedesco, 4 U.2d 248, 291 P.2d 1028.

That case

held and this Court re-affirmed that the value of unestablished
2

lots In a proposed or uncompleted subdivision could not be the
basis for fixing damages since the determination of cost to
achieve ultimate condition as subdivided

lots was not

only

conjectural and considerable but also that the ability to sell
the 1 ots at a profit after paying those, selling, and marked
absorption costs was impermissibly speci ilatjve.

We do uoi take

issue nor argue with that result.
What we respectfi il ] y submit is that on remand and in
reassessing damages the trial court did what was directed by
this Court in Thorsen 1:

it took the mutually agreed value of

the land prior to the damage inflicted by Thorsen and deducted
therefrom the value, after the damage had occurred, of the land
salable as an undivided tract of 50.59 acres (the amount of
land subject to this 1 I tJ gallon) and awarded damaqes based upon
the difference.

We respectfully suggest that the trial court

pursued what was the proper if not, because cf r:;e uniqueness
of the property and the circumstances established by the facts,
the

only

method

of

calculating

damages

under

the

clear

direction of this Court.

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
whether Rule 4 3(b) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
compels ai i i i.AcUvztz >f trie trial cour tf s reassessment of damages
where no evidence contradicts Gooseberry's proof by affidavits.
2.

Whether the trial court correctly applied the

rule of before-and-after

worth
3

of the property

damaged by

Thorsen!s

abusive

entry

upon

and

waste

committed

to

Gooseberry's lands.

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND CASE LAW
1.

Rule 43(b) [formerly Rule 43(e)], Utah Rules of

Civil Procedure which reads:
(b) Evidence on Motions, When a Motion is based on
facts not appearing of record the court may hear the
matter on affidavits presented by the respective
parties***
2.

State vs. Walker,

743 P . 2 d 1 9 1 , 193 ( U t a h 1 9 8 7 ) .

3.

Goodsell vs. Department of Business Regulation, 52 3 P . 2d 12 3 0

(Utah 1 9 7 4 ) .
4.
CA5 L a ) .

(Addendum v i )
5.

CA5 L a ) •

Board of Public Instruction vs. Meredith, 119 F . 2 d 712 ( 1 9 4 1 ,

Roue her vs. Traders & General Ins. Co., 235 F . 2 d 423 ( 1 9 5 6 ,

(Addendum v i i )
6.

Department of Highways vs. Schulhoff

167 C o l o . 7 2 , 445

P . 2 d 402 ( 1 9 6 8 ) .

PRIOR HOLDING OF THIS COURT
T h i s Court h e l d t h a t Thorsen had committed

actionable

i n j u r y t o G o o s e b e r r y ' s p r o p e r t y f o r w h i c h T h o r s e n was l i a b l e
d a m a g e s b u t n o t damages p r e d i c a t e d

upon t h e f o r m u l a

adopted

Court

trial

by t h e t r i a l

court's

ruling

court.
that

This

t h e damage

i n t e n t i o n a l l y a n d " * * * was m a s s i v e ,
[745 P . 2 d p . 1 2 4 8 ] .
4

initially

did not overturn

was d o n e

senseless,

in

willfully

the
and

and p u r p o s e l e s s "

The previous opinion of this Court is of estimable
assistance in narrowing the considerations basic to reassessing
damages:
1.

Mr. Justice Howe's analysis of the evidence

observes agreement of opinion expressed by appraisers for both
sides, and especially by Thorsen1s own appraiser, that the land
had a pre-damage value of $1,250.00 per acre for the 50.59
acres affected (745 P.2d at p. 1246).
2.

It is not proper to speculate on the amount which

subdivided lots might bring or to conjecture what would be the
cost of developing land into a subdivision disposable by the
unit of lots; nevertheless, it is proper to inquire what the
tract is worth, having in view the purpose for which it is best
adapted (746 P.2d at p. 1246).
mountain subdivision.
3.

That purpose is as a potential

(Id.)

Citing the case of Department of Highways vs. Schidhoff,

167 Colo. 72, 445 P.2d 402 (1968), this Court approved the
Colorado view that "it is proper to show that a particular
tract of land is suitable and available for subdivision into
lots and is valuable for that purpose" (745 P.2d at p. 1246).
We do not dispute the facts to the extent they are
listed

in Thorsen's Brief

("Brief") except we have to add

several determinations resolved in Thorsen I which are critical
to plenary examination of this new appeal:
(a)
Fact

and

The evidence fully supports the Finding of
Conclusion

of
5

the

Court

that

Thorsen

exceeded

and

abused

his

right

to

enter

upon

Gooseberry's land to clear the ditch and that he is
liable

for

damages

[underscored

(Thorsen

phrases

at

omitted

745

P. 2d

from

p.

1244

Appellant's

abridgment of Thorsen I at Brief p.5]).
(b)

The Supreme Court's observation that "the

ditch, as enlarged, might possibly impair access to
parts of the proposed lots, but there was no evidence
adduced

[at

the

original

trial

on

this

subject",

(f.n. at 1247 of 745 P.2d)]
(We submit

that the uncontradicted

affidavits

accompanying Gooseberry's Motion to reassess damages
supply,

in

the

manner

permitted

by

Rule

43(b)

U.R.C.P., evidence admittedly not adduced respecting
that subject.
(c)

Recognition of the Bench ruling by Judge

Tibbs that, after physically inspecting the property,
he was "shocked at the damage done to the premises
and [had] grave doubt *** it could even be used as a
subdivision"

(specific language of the trial

court

abstracted in the dissent, 745 P.2d at 1248).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Gooseberry

agrees

with

that

part

of

Thorsen's

Statement of the Case which details the history, the course of
proceedings and disposition in the Court below.

6

Following is a

brief augmenting Statement of Facts important to the issues for
review.

The Appellant will be referred to as "Thorsen" and the

Respondents will be referred to collectively as "Gooseberry".
Reference to proceedings in the trial court at which oral
testimony was taken will be made by attaching the relevant
pages

to

this

brief

indicating

the

page

number

reporter's transcript (Addendum pp. iv and v) .

in

the

The affidavits

filed under Rule 43(b) U.R.CP. are reproduced in full.

A map

for illustrative purposes is Addendum i; the affidavits as (ii)
and (iii) .

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Upon remand to the District Court Gooseberry filed
its Motion supported by affidavits and asking that damages be
reassessed in compliance with the direction of this Court.
The procedure adopted was as provided in Rule 43(b)
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure which reads:
(b) Evidence on Motions. When a Motion is
based on facts not appearing of record the
court may hear the matter on affidavits
presented by the respective parties***
The supporting affidavits are of D. Bruce Whited,
Professional
Gooseberry

Engineer
in the

and

original

Ken

Esplin,

trial.

appraiser

(Addenda

ii

used
and

by
iii,

respectively)
Appellant (Thorsen) filed no affidavits and offered
no evidence whatsoever countering the Motion or diluting the
grounds for the relief requested.
7

Thorsen did file an opposing

brief with the trial court but no affidavits were attached.
Summarized, the affidavits before the trial court
established

the

following

facts which,

on

reassessment

of

damages, were considered together with the existing record of
evidence and the trial Judge's personal view of the property.
The affidavits will be abbreviated and organized according to
affiant:
WHITED AFFIDAVIT
(Addendum ii)
1.

Twenty (2 0) years1 experience as

Qualifications.

a professional engineer designing and supervising construction
of municipal
airports,

systems for water, sewer, street, bridge and

and

subdivisions

design

including

and

supervision

those of

property in this litigation.
2.
and

examined

the

extent

type

development
planned

of

for the

(Addendum ii, pp. 1, 2)

Examination of Property.
the

of

of

damage

Inspected the property
inflicted

by

Thorsen.

(Addendum ii, p. 2)
3.

Feasibility

of

Restoration.

The

cost

of

restoring the property to its pre-damaged condition or even to
a condition capable of receiving improvements necessary for a
subdivision is prohibitive.

Uprooted, dislocated rocks and

trees of immensity could never be incorporated into the backfill.

(Addendum ii, p. 5)
4.

Even if restored without the trees the Thorsen

trenching created a drainage barrier that would jeopardize the
8

restored

area

as

well

as

all

lower

adjacent

property.

(Addendum ii, p. 4)
5.

Economics of Continuing Subdivision Project.

A

highly visible swath of the Thorsen trenching scars 18 out of
the 3 3 proposed lots.

Proposed prime lots are no longer prime.

The ability to realize an economic profit from the proposed
project no longer exists.

(Addendum ii, p. 6)

This scarring,

by implication, would affect prime acres both above and below
the trenching.
The following are neither conclusions nor opinions
but professional statements of fact declared upon the personal
knowledge of this Civil Engineer:
(a)

His estimates do not include the cost of

reforestation.
(b)

(Addendum ii, p. 3)

The huge trench prominently and permanently

scars the profuse, attractive
previously displayed.
(c)

forestation the land

(Addendum ii, pp. 3, 6)

A drainage barrier and erosion sluice could

not withstand a storm of even moderate intensity one
such of which would damage not only the restored area
but also the lower adjacent property.
insult

derogates

subdivision
proposed

except

lots.

every

lot

numbers
Those

12

10

in

This dredging
the

through

would

be

proposed
21

or

both

12
less

accessible because the trench blocks entrance, and
utterly

unattractive

because

9

of

the

trench's

proximity and bordering presence. (Addendum ii, p. 4)

ESPLIN AFFIDAVIT
(Addendum iii)
1.

The Character (Highest and Best Use) and Value of

the Raw Land Before Thorsen Activity.

The value of the 50.59

acres, without any improvements was $1,250.00 per acre in the
year 1980.

This was based upon its highest and best use which

was as a subdivision or a mountain lot development.

The Esplin

affidavit distinguishes the remainder of the land purchased by
Gooseberry and not proposed as a sub-division but also states
it has a value of $1,250.00 per acre; however, that land is an
abundant mountain meadow.
2.
uses

(Addendum iii, p. 2)

Other Possible Uses of Land.

for the land damaged

grazing, which
development.
3.
Trenching.

was

There were no other

(hill-side property) except for

the use

next

highest

to

mountain

lot

(Addendum iii, p. 2)
Value

of the Land

Before

and After Thorsen

The value of the land for its suitability and

availability for subdivision into lots and as raw land capable
of conversion to that purpose was $1,250.00.

Its value now is

for grazing only and at a value of $50.00 per acre.

But in

1980 (apparently because of decreasing land values since 1980)
the value of the raw land for grazing would have been $100.00
per acre.

(Addendum iii, p. 3)

10

THORSEN1S CONTENTIONS
While admitting that both parties agreed the fair
market value was $1,250.00 per acre [Brief Par. 5(f) p.9] still
Thorsen ignores the uncontradicted evidence on record that the
land, deprived of its potential value as a subdivision is
$50.00 an acre now; $100.00 per acre immediately after the
damage occurred.

Thorsen seems to imply that the pre-damage

values were also based upon agricultural use.
inconsistent with the facts.

This is wholly

The remainder of the 94.47 acres,

after severing the 50.9 acres in issue, is a lush meadow having
capacity to support many cattle or livestock during the entire
Summer.
trees.

The subject land is dry ground covered with native
Thorsenfs own appraiser, at the time of trial, regarded

the highest and best use value of the hillside property as
subdivision development.

At page 365 of the trial record Mr.

Stott, testifying for Thorsen said:
[P. 365]:
could

be used

I tried to find properties which were—

for development

or were

in the process of

development, developed such as the subject property.

(lines

22-25)
Q.

—

have you (as a result of the process) found an

opinion or to the fair market value of the subject property?
A.

(p. 366)

"*** $1,250.00 per acre ***"

(lines 9,

10)
The Affidavit of Ken Esplin attached to Gooseberry's
Motion to Assess Damages states that it is not now feasible to
11

develop a subdivision on the property (Addendum iii, p. 2). He
states that the highest and best use for the property in 1980
(or prior to the dredging committed by Mr, Thorsen) was as a
"Subdivision or Mountain Lot Development" [Addendum iii, p. 2
Par, 4(c)].
The Affidavit of the engineer D. Bruce Whited states
that because of the excavation the property cannot be used for
its previous highest and best use.

On page 5 he states:

present

subject]

condition

of

your

suitable for subdivision.

[the

property

is

"The
not

The new ditch excavation, even after

restoration, has made it virtually impossible to develop the
subdivision at a profit".
Thorsen's

only

(Whited Affidavit, Addendum ii, p.5)
position

is

that

the

respective

parties' appraisers agreed that the pre-damage value of the
land

in question was based upon

purposes.
record

its use for

agricultural

Nothing in the record supports this and in fact the

is unambiguous that the $1,250.00 per acre was, as

stated in the Colorado case, Department of Highways vs. Schulhoff, supra,
based upon this particular tract of land's suitability and
availability for subdivision into lots and that it is valuable
for that purpose.

[$1,250.00 an acre for side-hill grazing

would be an unheard of exaggeration of value.]
We have attached as Addendum i a reduced copy of the
trial court's Exhibit 1 which displays the entire 94.47 acres
owned by Gooseberry.

From this addendum it is apparent that

the whole of the original Gooseberry purchase is composed of
12

two contrasting qualities of land having entirely different
characteristics:

The west portion is an abundant meadow; the

east (damaged) portion is an uncultivable side-hill forested
with pine and juniper.
proposed

It is this east portion which was

for development

and

which

now

has

development and limited value even as grazing.
p. 2)

no value

for

(Addendum iii,

The appraisers in the original trial valued the meadow

(the "remainder" and not subject to this litigation) for its
obviously useful meadow grass production.

The damaged land

(Brief at p. 6) is the hill-side; without value except for
sparse grazing and according to both Gooseberry affidavits now
not suitable for development.

The uncontradicted affidavits of

Whited and Esplin say that after and because of the Thorsen
trenching

the

50.9

acre

remainder

is

not

suitable

for

development and its value for grazing on the 1980 market was
$100.00 per acre.
The "diminution of value" rule on a before-and-after
calculation is $1,250.00 before, $100.00 after, yielding net
damage of $1,150.00 per acre for 50.9 acres, or $58,535.00
total diminution in value.

The trial court reduced this to

$38,785.00 in its calculation of the amount of land affected
presumably

on

its

inference

that

perhaps

one

or

more

individually-located houses could be built upon remote corners
of the damaged 50.9 acres.

(See Addendum i)

It would have

been speculative what one or possibly a few more building
tracts would have been worth.

However, this does not affect
13

the uncontradicted proof that the before and after difference
in value of the 50.9 acres was $1,150.00 per acre.
As noted above, the affidavits were served with the
Motion

to

Reassess

Damages

and

as

the

best

effort

to

accommodate the Supreme Court's formula and method(s) under
which damages should have been fixed in the first instance.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
1.

Uncontradicted

affidavits

under

Rule

43(b),

U.R.C.P. unequivocally fix the damages.
2.

Rule 43(b) is to be treated much like Rule 56,

U.R.C.P. particularly subsection (e) of Rule 56 which requires
a defense, if available; otherwise movant's affidavits are
dispositive of the facts.
3.

The trial court appropriately used a formula for

determining before and after values.
4.

Rule 43(b), U.R.C.P.

Rule of Civil Procedure 43(e).

parallels the old Federal
[The Utah Rules have been

modified to convert prior Rule 43(e) now to become Rule 43(b).]
Two Federal cases conclude that Rule 43 is to be considered in
cases, not necessarily involving Summary Judgment, in the same
manner as Rule 56(e) is applied where Summary Judgment
asked.

im

Roucher vs. Traders & General Insurance Company, 235 F.2d 423;

Board of Public Instruction vs. Meredith, et al., 119 F.2d 712.

In Roucher it is implied that Rule 43 is the "parent11
Rule (to affidavit-proof in Summary Judgments) providing for
14

admissibility

of

evidence

by

affidavits

made

reflecting

personal knowledge.
In Board of Public Instruction vs. Meredith, 119 F.2d 712, the

Fifth Federal Circuit holds that in contested cases affidavits
are sufficient to prove material facts when they conform with a
rule such as Rule

43 and Rule 56 of the Rules of Civil

Procedure.

ARGUMENT
The Affidavit of Mr. Esplin states that the next
highest and best use below being developed as a subdivision or
as mountain lots is grazing.

[Addendum iii, p. 3

Par. 4(e)]

Its highest value at the highest and best use immediately
beneath subdivision or mountain development is for grazing,
worth

$100.00 per

acre.

Esplin

states that there

is no

intermediate use between mountain subdivision and grazing (Id.
Par. 4(c)].
The Supreme Court has held that expert testimony for
both sides fixed the value of the land at $1,250.00 per acre.
(745 P. 2d at p. 1246)

The value now is only $50.00 per acre;

however, as we recognize that values must be fixed as of the
date of inflicting the damage
value of the land

(which was 1980) the salvage

(for grazing as expressed

Affidavit) was, in 1980, $100.00 per acre.

in the Esplin

Deducting $100.00

per acre from $1,250.00 leaves $1,150.00 per acre as damage.
The Supreme Court recognized the trial court's finding that
15

Gooseberry contemplated subdividing 50.59 acres (745 P.2d at
1245) which, when multiplied by $1,150.00 per acre, leaves the
sum of $58,178.50.
A condemnation

case from the State of Washington

(Lange, et aL vs. State of Washington, 547 P. 2d 282) is parallel in that

Thorsenfs

actions

effectively

condemn

the

most

valuable

incident of Gooseberry's property, i.e.: the right to develop
it.

In

effect,

uncontrovertible

Thorsen"s

effect

of

unlawful

condemning

action

the

had

the

Gooseberry

land

because what was left after Thorsen invaded it was a severance
impossible to reassemble.

In the Lange case the Court said:

In
this
case,
the
effect
of
the
condemnation
activity
was
to
chain
appellant to his land in a falling real
estate market. Once the State manifested
its unequivocal intent to appropriate the
Lange property, appellants were precluded
from exercising their business judgment and
selling the property before the market fell
further.
Moreover,
appellants
were
precluded
from
taking
any
steps
to
counteract the market decline by making
improvements on the land or otherwise
changing its use.
Thus, appellants were
deprived of the most important incidents of
ownership, the rights to use and alienate
property.
In addition, because the
condemnation did in fact take place,
appellants were prevented from holding
their property, as other owners would be
able to do, until economic conditions
improved and market values rose again.
The findings of the trial court are not "clearly
erroneous", if erroneous at all, although we suggest that the
trial court should have awarded a higher amount to Gooseberry.
The

evidence

demonstrably

supports
16

the

amount

of

damages

reassessed.

This court will examine all of the record evidence

giving great weight to the findings made and the

inferences

drawn by the trial judge and setting them aside only if they
State vs. Walker, 743 P. 2d 191, 193 (Utah

are clearly erroneous.
1987).

In Goodsell vs. Department of Business Regulation, 523 P. 2d 1230

(Utah

1974)

this

Court

likewise

held

that

under

several

theories presented to the trial court the Appellate Court will
affirm

any

result

which

finds

support

in

the

record

irrespective of the theory under which that ground or basis was
argued (cited at 5 C.J.S., Appeal and Error. §1464(1).
Therefore, under any theory or method of calculating
damages, the Plaintiffs are entitled to recover at the least
the amount fixed by the trial court, which was the most modest
of all awards possible.

CONCLUSION
This Court has affirmed (at pp. 1244 and 1245 of 745
P. 2d) several determinations made by the District Court and
pointed out rules to be followed in reassessing damages:
(1)

That the evidence "fully supports the findings

of fact and conclusions that Thorsen exceeded and abused his
right to enter upon Gooseberry's land to clean the ditch and
that Thorsen is liable for damages".

(Majority opinion

for

Justice Howe at p. 1244 of 745 P.2d).
(2)

The trenching included "a substantial widening

17

and deepening of the ditch whereby a large number of trees were
uprooted

and

an

excessive

amount

of

earth

and

rocks

were

excavated" (Id, reciting holdings of lower Court).
(3)

The generally

accepted measure of damage for

injury to real property is the difference between the value of
the

property

immediately

before

and

immediately

after

the

injury ("Diminution in Value" rule).
(4)

It is proper to inquire what the entire tract is

worth, having in view the purpose for which it is best adapted,
but it is the tract, and not the lots into which it might be
divided, that is to be valued.
(5)

It is proper to show that a particular tract of

land is suitable and available for subdivision into lots and is
valuable

for that purpose

(although not proper to show the

number and value of lots as separated parcels in an imaginary
subdivision thereof).
We

respectfully

submit

that

the

uncontradicted

evidence before the Court predicated upon this Court directive,
is that Gooseberry was damaged by $38,750.00 as the calculated
direct damage to Gooseberry's property.
trial

court

in

reassessing

damages

The Judgment of the
should

be

summarily

affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
OLSEN, McIF$\ ^CHAMBERLAIN
By.
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Ken Chambefelail
Attorneys fbr Respondent
Gooseberry Estates

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I
foregoing
Jackman

hereby

Brief
of

certify

that

four

(4)

of Respondents were mailed

Jackman

and

Johnson,

Attorneys

copies

of

the

to Fredrick A.
for

Appellant

Thorsen, 1327 South 800 East, Suite 300, Orem, Utah (84058), by
U.S. regular mail, postage prepaid, on thfs 28th day of March,
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Proposed Plat of Johnson Property,
Reduction of Exhibit No. 4-B

Thorsen Excavation
Upper Ditch (existing)
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KEN CHAMBERLAIN [0608]
OLSEN, M C I F F & CHAMBERLAIN
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS
76 SOUTH MAIN, P.O. BOX 100
RICHFIELD, UTAH 84701
TELEPHONE: 896-A461
TM

TJJT?

Y,

CTYTU

STATE OF UTAH
* * * * * * * * *

HARRY THORSEN,

)

AFFIDAVIT OF
D. BRUCE WHITED
'."CH RESTORATION COST
AND SUMMARY

Plaintiff,

is
-J

vs

"

8 * 2

MARKAY JOHNSON, v\

I-' ' .:»:. .

5 d2
i ^5

° 6 I
u. o 9
II. O

l'i "i I Nil, 84fil
GOOSEBERRY ESTATFC

^

Plaintiffs,

S a
2 z <t
UJ D
U) al
_l «

o

ol ,

vs .
HARRY ThGl-.SE:, ^r:c .-CNA..J
GATES,
Defendants.

•-H
•..OUM\ or

)

)
u.

BRUCE

ss

WHITED, being

first

duly

sworn

deposes and says:
That he ii
practiced

in

a duly ! 1 censed professional c-ngir.eer having
---•>..:..--

engineer iron iht 1'nivcrsit.y ^:.

-.--..e

±266.

n<r

••

graduate

. ,:u • =ind a° a ci . .. engineer ., .i-

- 2President and Manager of Canyon Lands Engineering Corporation, a
Richfield, Utah engineering

firm;

has been

a civil engineer

designing and supervising the construction of municipal water,
sewer, street, highway, bridge and other infra-structural systems
and has designed and supervised

the construction of dams and

airports; that he is familiar with rules, regulations, ordinances
in general or special laws related to all types of subdivisions.
During the last twenty years he has supervised the development of

Is

mountain

subdivisions,

among

them

the

types

of

w 2 o
n
**

included

in

*
0 * 5
i5

knowledge concerning the economics of such endeavors.

development

J -

!°!
* i

3

IL O 3
IL O j|

0 j x*
Z *
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Z z «
LU »
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J «

the

captioned

litigation,

D. Bruce Whited makes

and

has

comprehensive

the following statement under

oath concerning the Gooseberry Estate Subdivision:
I have physically
present

condition

of

the

inspected
proposed

and

know

mountain

the past and
subdivision

0

hereinafter described; have investigated the cost of restoring
the land to a condition comparable to its condition before any
unauthorized excavation or trenching of a ditch thereupon was
made in approximately 1980 and effect thereof and the condition
of said land if attempts are made to restore it to its former
condition.
DITCH RESTORATION COST AND SUMMARY
PROJECT LOCATION:
Gooseberry Estates Subdivision, Sevier County, Utah

- 3 INTRODUCTION:
In

order

to

determine

the

cost

of

this

ditch

restoration project, it is first necessary to identify the upper
limits of the restoration process.

The cost to totally restore

the subject area to its original, undisturbed condition is not
definable.

There are some elements of the project which have

been destroyed and can never be duplicated or replaced,
SCOPE:

For the purpose of the cost estimate, I have limited the

scope of project to include the restoration of the area to near,
original elevations and contour.

The scope does not include any

of the costs involved in establishing new, suitable tree growth,
nor does it address any measures required to camouflage the scar
allowing the restored area to blend into the adjacent areas. The
scope

does,

however,

include

the

cost

to

properly

backfill

and compact the excavation, preparation of the suitable seedbed,
installation

of erosion

control

structures

and

the follow-up

maintenance that will be required.
GENERAL INFORMATION:
The

on-site

inspection

of

the

area

revealed

the

following items of concern:
1.

The work area is confined and will require considerable
hand labor to restore it properly.

2.

Proper construction methods and equipment selection by
the contractor will be required in order to minimize
additional damages to the area.

- 4There are numerous large rocks and tree debris that
cannot be incorporated in the backfill.
will have to be removed

This material

from the site and properly

disposed of.
The

soil

conditions

excavation.

vary

along

the

length

of

the

In those areas where bedrock and heavy

clays were encountered additional fill material will be
required to provide a proper seedbed.
The
w 2 o
DQ

•

1

* 5

«3

s
5

*

o
J

excavated

ditch

has

created

a

drainage

barrier along the entire length of the subdivision.
Special preventive measures must be incorporated into
the restoration process to prevent

storm water from

w

£ I

g H

2 z a:
Hi »
U) «

O

newly

destroying the completed work.

Loosely compacted soil

in a confined excavation of this type is easily eroded
if the ditch is not properly

compacted.

If erosion

control structures are not installed, it is likely that
a storm of moderate intensity would cause considerable
damage to both the restored area as well as the lower
adjacent property.

COST ESTIMATE
The cost to restore the excavation
elevation and contour are;

to its original

- 5 No.

Item

Cost

1.

Backfill and compacting

$15,000

2.

Rock Removal and clean-up

4,000

3.

Seedbed preparation

3,500

4.

Seeding

1,500

5.

Erosion control structure

2,500

6.

Supervision and maintenance

5,000

7.

Contingencies at 10%

3,200

Total Cost

$34,700

ECONOMICS OF CONTINUING THE PROJECT UNDER EXISTING CONDITIONS
The present condition of your property is not suitable
for

subdividing.

The

new

ditch

restoration, has made it virtually

excavation,
impossible

even

after

to develop the

subdivision at a profit.
The

original

development

unchanged at $5,200 per

lot.

cost

In order

for

the

33

lots

is

to cover development

costs, land costs, cost of money, sales commissions and realize a
profit of at least $2,000 per lot, the average sales price needs
to be $12,000 per lot.
It is my opinion that before the ditch excavation, the
majority of the lots would bring a minimum of $12,000.

I would

also expect the undisturbed lots adjacent to the Meadow to sell
for slightly higher amounts as they were the most desirable.

- 6It

is

my

opinion

that

because

of

the

extensive

excavation on the 11 previously undisturbed lots, 9 of which
border the Meadow, lot sales will not average $12,000,

There are

now 18 lots out of 33 lots which will have major, highly visible
swaths cut through the center, or near center.
are no longer prime.
been

decreased

The prime lots

In addition, even the undisturbed lots have

in value

because

the

general

conditions

and

overall aesthetics of the project have been adversely effected.
In summary, the development costs

(all fixed costs)

have remained the same but the ability to make a profit from
subdividing the property no longer exists.
the

project

has

been

decreased

by

an

The overall value of
amount

equal

to

the

projected minimum of profit.

^/0^<^^^^^^
D. Bruce Whited, P.E.
License No. ^,T3<^>/^
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me, a notary public,
this

>0?f

.£/

day of F e b r u a r y , 1988.

•/£jMi{^
Residing At: <^0
My Commission Expires

f

jf/?f°/02!&

VraoTAnv

2T*of

- ^

KEN CHAMBERLAIN [0608]
OLSEN, McIFF & CHAMBERLAIN
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS
76 SOUTH MAIN, P.O. BOX 100
RICHFIELD, UTAH 84701
TELEPHONE: 896-4461
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SEVIER COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH.
* * * * * * * * *

HARRY THORSEN,

)

Plaintiff,

)

vs.

)

MARKAY JOHNSON, et al.,

)
:
)

AFFIDAVIT OF KEN ESPLIN
CONCERNING DAMAGES

:

Civil No. 8461

Defendants.
GOOSEBERRY ESTATES, et al.,
Plaintiffs,

:
)

vs.

:

HARRY THORSEN and DONALD
GATES,
Defendants.

:
)
)

* * * * * * * * * * * * * *

STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF IRON

)

KEN ESPLIN, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes
and says:
1.

That he is the witness, Ken Esplin, who testified

as an expert in the captioned case which was tried on the 26th
and 27th days of August, 1982 in the Sixth Judicial District
Court in and for Sevier County.

2.

That he repeats the same background experience,

credentials and foundational statements he made as a basis for
and authorizing his expressing or testifying as to an opinion
concerning value of land.
3.

That as he testified in the captioned case at the

time to trial he has inspected the real property known as the
proposed Gooseberry Estates Subdivision.
4.
experience

C o
J
"
t *

\ °:

a

z
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U »
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to which he

same

background,

testified

in

credentials

the captioned

and

case and

expresses the following opinions:

3 x *
H

the

incorporating all the same by reference in this Affidavit he

(a) He reiterates the testimony that the real property

L O 3
E

Using

subject of litigation consisting of approximately 50.9 acres was
worth, without any improvements

in the year 1980 the sum of

$1250.00 per acre.
(b)

That it is not economically feasible to develop

the land as a subdivision or for any other purposes without a
complete restoration of the soil, the surface, the vegetation (or
at least a substantial degree of vegetation including trees) as
would be required in order to develop the land for any purpose.
(c) He is of the opinion that the highest and best use
of the property in 1980 prior to the excavation made thereon by
the defendant Harry Thorsen was as a subdivision or a mountain
lot development.

That was the highest and best use then and

there were no other uses available for the land then except for
grazing.

- 3(d)

He has now reviewed evidence of D. Bruce Whited,

made under oath, of the cost of restoring and the obstacles to a
complete

restoration

of

the

subject

property

opinion that the development thereof as

and

is of the

a subdivision is not

feasible, either physically or economically,
(e)

He is of the opinion that the property's next and

highest best use after development as a subdivision or a mountain
development was, in the year 1980 and immediately prior to the
: o
. o

damage done to it by the defendant Harry Thorsen, $100.00 per

l x

co

•

O

:

(L x

acre.

He is of the opinion that the value of the land as of

February 20th, 1988 is the sum of $50.00 per acre and that is and
was the value of said land at its highest and best use to which

!s 1
:s a
: z*

it could be devoted now or could have been devoted at any time
after the excavation made by Harj^y-JThovsen.

I ID
> N

I *»
)

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me, a notary public,
this

day of February, 1988.

Notary Public
Residing At:

Cedar City, Utah

.on Expires:

AT so, in naking a comparison apnroach through
market value, if it's possible, to do a market grid, which
I tried to do and through some interpretation of that,
I placed the dollar figures on the comparable sales.
0

Anything else involved in your process?

A

In looking at the overall property and the

approach to take, I did look at whether to take the
apnroach as to a corroleted subdivision and I did not
take this apnroach for a counle of reasons:
First o^ all, there are a number of properties that are in about the sane stage in the county as
the subject property, waiting to get approval for water
and that being the nalor hold up on those properties.
Also, in the Accord Lakes Area, I did not use
anv conparabl^s thore.

There hive been sales there-

The reason being is that that is an approved subdivision,
a drv subdivision, there are existing cabins there and
a great deal of nonev and time has been spent in advertising and give away programs, "If you come up, we'll give
you a gift just for looking at the property," and I didn't
feel like that would be a good conparable so I tried to
find properties which were —

could be used for develop-

ment or were in the nrooe?^ of being developed, developed
such as the subject nroperty.
O

'low, as a result of that process then, have

366
1

you f o m e d an oninion as to the fair market value of the

2

subject property?

3
4

A
|

Yes, as contained in the appraisal, I have

indicated that the irrigations do affect the market value

5

of property; however, to clean such ditches has no

6

measurable value or effect on the market value.

7

sale is considered as to time, location, physical character

8

istics, and condition of sale ^ased on the market condi-

9

tions.

10

Each

It is rv/ opinion that the market value of the

subject property is £1,250.00 per acre.

11

0

12

report?

And you reduced your appraisal work to a

13 I

A

Yes.

14

0

H"ve you reduced your appraisal into a writ-

15

ten report?

'6

A

Yes, I have.

17

0

And --

18 I

TirS COTRT:

Let ne just ask a question

19

so I can understand your last answer.

20 II

that, in your opinion, this ditch doesn't make any dif-

21 A

ference one way or another?

22

A

Are you saying

Well, I did not appraise it as a subdivision.

23

I appraised it as 50.5° acros in an as-is condition and

24 ||

through the inspection that T r^ade of the property, it

25

was tny opinion that it did, that a ditch iid exist there,
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<JifT>rrnl pu rdhaaer*, and not hy conjectural accounting estimated alone, Auto- menta on a cumulative hem in for an enroatir C-anteen Co. v. K. T. C„ 1963, 3 4 6 tire year. The complaint is that this
U i x 61, 6K, 73 S.Ot. 1017. 97 I,.Ed. #454. approach uses saving?! rralint*? on large
i t *»flji not. errnr to allow the Jury to ron- transactions with the favored customers
Mider Una evidence. The trial i m i r l to justify discrtmination in their favor
fkomteif oat the failure of defendant to on transactions invoiv**? mnaJJer quanintroduce prpciac data. And properly d i s - tities, equivalent to plaintiff's purchascounted th<>. weight of this evidence b y es. To require a seller in these circumadverting to "throe intangible clerocnto" stance* to jfJHtify thu co.*t differential in
an !**ing the proper subjects of revolt d- each and every tranniiction with hi»
oration oiify "for what they are worth.* buyers, rather than on the aggregate
[2j Sr.ttsrul, plaintiff also aJJcgcs e r - baais of their dcaliiM/a, would prove unr o r in that part of the charge concert* duly onerous. The impact of such a reinjr the validity of the accounting pro- quirement might he to discourage mil
c e d u r e embodied in defendants coat price differential*, even thoae actually
**twdy. 8irjce Harper had no rcfevartt justified by cost distinctions. Absent a
c e w t records for the period of I1M1 t o showing that tac lark of uniformity in
1?>60, t/i<* ;*ccounta0t hired to prepare t h e the price spread had any competitive
n t u d y u««Mi figures for 2961, adjusted significance, the FTC has permitted the
backward* on the basis of general salary use of aggregate coat dilferciKjea to jusr - i t e s puhNshcd by the Commerce a n d tify price differentials. See, e, g.. In re
i n d u s t r y Association of New York. A l - £iytvar>ia Klectric Prodncta, Inc^ 1954,
O i o n g b such an accounting nv-thud o b - ^ ' C Docket No. 5728, :i VAVtl Trade Reg.
v i o u s l y lack* the fuAJ mcaaure of <fe*ired Rep. | 2&.J81. cSuch u method wsu* perp r e c i s i o n , i(. apjpcars to have been under- raissibJe in this r*&e. Furfiicrmore, the
t a k e n in gaod faith and to accord! w i t h trial court left the uTUmatje vaiidity of
U b e minimal requirements of soond a c - this computation to the determination of
c o i i n H n g principles. Indeed, under Ui« the jnrycriricamstaiic<«, it appears to have been
Tkird, plaintiff aMr«resi that the court
t h e be*t available procedure. Both t h e erred in charging the jifry that it could
c o u r t * and the Federal Trade Cnmmia- deduct pro Umltt frt*n the amount of
Hion have retmKniiced the dilemma c o n - dAromxcH, if any. the extent of saving
f r o n t i n g defendants in suit* such an retailing from the transactions with the
t h o s e , And have liberally accepted data faivored costamer*. Although one court
H e r i v e d from Ijt*^ntion-inspired /iccoont- haa approved tfcis partud justifitratioii
i r i K methods. S*c e. jr., American Can approach, see American *lan f>3. v. Jtns<^o. v. Ruiwu'ftvilJc Canning Co., H Cir.. aellville Csnning Co.. 8 f.ir.. 15)51, 191
J D S I , I9f F 2 d rtHt 59, and In re Minne- YJ2d .V!, 6<»T it ia not r>eocv*aary for as to
« p n l i s Honeywell Regulator Co., 194S, 44 consider its validity sini-p the jury reF . T . C . 361, VM.
Moreover, the trial turned a verdict in favor of defendant
csotirt correctly charged the jury that i t and therefore never rearhrtd the question
w \ n s "up to you as fx> whether yon wish of the measure of damage*.
t o accept or reject the assumptions made
[ 3 ] With respect to the aUeged prejtoy Gayfe (defendant's accountant] and
t h e conclusions which he drew from udicial comment, fhc pEatntiif clairaa that
the trial court in his charge to the jury
them."
tindnly emphasized a fetter wrftten by
.A further contention of plaintiff is piaintiff to his creditors ah<irtry after
t t i a t the court erred in refusing to a fire had destroyed his office building.
c K a r g c tJhat defendant's cost sfndy im- The fetter indicated that p b in tiff was
p r o p e r l y calculated comparative coef* unable to pay hi* debts at ttiat time bef o r plaintiff and defendant's three larg- cause all available ra*b, including i»e s t jobber*, by averaging total ship- auranee proc^eda, was being used to
convert the building into un apart meat

moxsemm t. njuaua * araraLix mmnukxm oour Ainr
atmmm 2Sft W.M 411

loose The trial judge afludod so this
letter in res|kect to its bearing sw the
puuntiffa credibility as a witness, siace
contradicted his oral testimony,
it
plaintiff's testimony waa an essentia)
j„gredient of his case, as evidenced by
hi«, appearance on the witness staoo) on
Ave Hoeresaive days, and it waa not er~
r^r for <-he court to advert to that evidence, threat discretion ia accorded federal judges in commenting out portions
of the evidence, aod even in expressing
opinions with regard thereto, provided
it is stated that the jury is the exclusive
judge of the facts and need not adopt
any opinion eipressed. Querela v. United Stale* f 1*33. 289 U.S. 486, 46^-470,
S3 SCt. W8, 77 L.Kd. 1821; Pager *.
Pennsylvania Rail Co.. 2 Cir., 1S47, 166
F.Sd tt, &o; Flint v. Youngs town Sheet
A Tnbe C^., 2 Cir., 1944, 143 FJKd 923,
92/». These precautiona were observed
by the court. Furthermore, the trial
judge properly informed the jury that
the plaintiff's motive for bringing the
actioa had absolutely no bearing on his
rights under the ftohinaon-Paiman Act,
but waa relevant only to the extent that
it bore on his credibility aa a witneaa.

Eastern District m€ Ixaiisiana, Herb*
W. Ca^natenberry, Chief Judge, g r a a t
summary tmr the defendant inasjrna
coaapaay and an aanaeai waa Ufccn. Tl
Csairt af Appeals, Kxvr^ Circuit Jndg
held thai teatiaaany aa given s a s I n
af a previous case, as related as an a4
davit of counsel, waa not adsntassb
where neither the present ptaisitaff m*
anyone renreaenting him e e in nervti
with him waa a pnrty to the previea
action.
Reversed and cause reaaanrlad fc
trial oa the raerita.

K3JT2>

Where plaiHUff to antaanahile neg
ligence action in federal court had ac
been party to prior action in state ca*r<
judgment §i stale court wee net re
judicata in the action in federal eanrri
2. ffegnfranoa «=»lMta, 91
As general rule, iaauea of negligtng
are not to be determined •usamsrity, am
qoeation of a defendant's liability caa
not be determined by court aa saaltsr o
law nnlesn facts are andisnnttat said an
auch that all reaaaaable snem, ha exer
ctae af fair and impartial Jndgaitnf
muat infer and conclude thenfrasa ULS
defendant waa not negligent.

Since the trial court did not err in Its
instructions to the j«ry, but rather left
to it the determination of all issues of
fart after proper inntructions on the law,
the judgment below muat be affirmed.
S. Veducal Oval rVwcednre «^snsa1
AffirmedAmdavita are not adamiaaaase on sso
tioa far summary jodgmest ualasn thei
are mads on personal knowledge. Fed
Rule* Ctv.frac. rule 56<e) # 28 UJSC.A

vTOHam KJwartf BOUCHER
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4. r e d e r n i a v t t i
Generally, adnsiasi bib ty of evidence
on motion for aumraary judgsaend hi i
ject to rale relating to form and i
biltty of evUUmat generally. Fsatstsuea
Civ.Pruc. roles 4 3 ( a ) . 6 6 ( e ) , 21 U A C A

I

I t h r l rYoetdure Generally, evidence
hearing mi a oaae would be ioadssaVssablc
on motion for ssMnasary /aJgsaanm, eaaept
that court may hear matter an nlldsrvita.
Antomohile negligence action. The Fed.»ukn Civ Proc rules 4 2 ( e ) , 66(e>,
United States District Court for the 28 U.S.(1A.
United States Court of AppeaJa
Fifth Circuit.
July 20, 19S6.
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